If Asia, with its dynamism and power struggles, in some ways resembles the Europe of 100 years ago, the Middle East is more reminiscent of the Europe of several centuries before: a patchwork of top-heavy monarchies, internal turbulence, unresolved conflicts, and nationalities that cross and contest boundaries. Europe’s ability to influence the course of this region, too, will be sharply limited.
如果說充滿活力和權力斗爭的亞洲在某些方面與一百年前的歐洲類似，那么中東更像是幾百年前的歐洲：不穩(wěn)定的君主制國家、國內的動蕩局勢、尚未解決的沖突、族群混雜且爭奪勢力范圍，這些因素都摻雜在一起。歐洲影響該地區(qū)進程的能力也將是極為有限的。

Political and demographic changes within Europe, as well as the United States, also ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose prominence. In Europe, the E.U. project still consumes the attention of many, but for others, especially those in southern Europe facing unsustainable fiscal shortfalls, domestic economic turmoil takes precedence. No doubt, Europe’s security challenges are geographically, politically and psychologically less immediate to the population than its economic ones. Mounting financial problems and the imperative to cut deficits are sure to limit what Europeans can do militarily beyond their continent.
歐洲內部及美國在政治和人口結構方面的變化也注定了這個跨大西洋聯(lián)盟會失去重要性。在歐洲，歐盟一體化方案仍然得到了許多國家的關注，但是對于其他國家來說，特別是對于歐洲南部出現難以為繼的財政赤字的國家來說， 國內的經濟亂象是卻在第一位的。無疑， 歐洲的安全難題在地理、政治和心理方面對于歐洲人的影響都不像經濟難題那么緊迫。日益突出的金融問題和削減赤字的必要性必定會限制歐洲各國在歐洲大陸以外所能采取的軍事行動。


Moreover, intimate ties across the Atlantic were forged at a time when American political and economic power was largely in the hands of Northeastern elites, many of whom traced their ancestry to Europe and who were most interested in developments there. Today’s United States — featuring the rise of the South and the West, along with an increasing percentage of Americans who trace their roots to Africa, Latin America or Asia — could hardly be more different. American and European preferences will increasingly diverge as a result.
此外， 當年大西洋兩岸建立親密關系時，美國的政治和經濟大權基本上學握在東北部精英手中，他們當中的許多人祖上來自歐洲，這些人最為關注歐洲的發(fā)展。如今的美國和過去截然不同，凸顯為美國南部和西部的興盛， 且非裔、拉丁美裔或亞裔的美國人越來越多。這樣一來， 美國和歐洲的傾向性會越來越不相同。


Finally, the very nature of international relations has also undergone a transformation. Alliances, whether NATO during the Cold War or the U.S.-South Korean partnership now, do best in settings that are highly inflexible and predictable, where foes and friends are easily identified, potential battlefields are obvious, and contingencies can be anticipated.
最后，國際關系的性質本身也經歷了一次轉變。不管是冷戰(zhàn)期間的北約還是現在的美韓伙伴關系，聯(lián)盟關系在以下情況下最能發(fā)揮作用：高度固定且可以預知的背景;敵友易于分辨；潛在的戰(zhàn)場顯而易見；緊急情況能夠預期。

Almost none of this is true in our current historical moment. Threats are many and diffuse. Relationships seem situational, increasingly dependent on evolving and unpredictable circumstances. Countries can be friends, foes or both, depending on the day of the week — just look at the United States and Pakistan. Alliances tend to require shared assessments and explicit obligations; they are much more difficult to operate when worldviews diverge and commitments are discretionary. But as the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Libya all demonstrate, this is precisely the world we inhabit.
在當前的歷史時期， 上述幾項幾乎都不存在。威脅不僅多樣而且分散; 國家間的關系似乎變得情境化， 越來越取決于不斷變化和無法預知的環(huán)境; 各國之間可以是朋友、敵人或者亦敵亦友， 就看是處于一周當中的哪一天了， 美國和巴基斯坦之間的關系就是個例子。聯(lián)盟關系往往需要有共同的判斷和明確的義務;如果世界觀存在著不同而且承擔的義務是自由決定的， 要運作一個聯(lián)盟就變得困哪得多。不過伊拉克、阿富汗及現在的利比亞沖突全部表明， 這正是我們現在所處的這個世界的特點。

For the United States, the conclusions are simple. First, no amount of harping on what European governments are failing to do will push them toward what some in Washington want them to do. They have changed. We have changed. The world has changed.
對于美國來說，結論很簡單。首先，再怎么喋喋不休地嘮叨歐洲政府各國沒有做到的事情也不會讓他們朝著華盛頓希望的方向前進。他們變了，我們變了，全出界都變了。

Second, NATO as a whole will count for much less. Instead, the United States will need to maintain or build bilateral relations with those few countries in Europe willing and able to act in the world, including with military force.
其次，北約作為一個整體的重要性將大為降低。相反，美國需要與歐洲為數不多的愿意并能夠在全球事務中采取行動， 其中包括動用武力的國家保持或建立雙邊關系。

Third, other allies are likely to become more relevant partners in the regions that present the greatest potential challenges. In Asia, this might mean Australia, India, South Korea, Japan and Vietnam, especially if U.S.-China relations were to deteriorate; in the greater Middle East, it could again be India in addition to Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and others.
第三，在構成最大的潛在挑戰(zhàn)的地區(qū)，其他盟友可能會成為更加重要的合作伙伴。在亞洲，這樣的盟友也許是澳大利亞、印度、韓國、日本和越南，特別是在美國與中國關系出現惡化的情況下；在大中東地區(qū)，可能還是需要印度這個盟友，此外還有土耳其、以色列、沙特阿拉伯及其他國家。

None of this justifies a call for NATO’s abolition. The alliance still includes members whose forces help police parts of Europe and who could contribute to stability in the Middle East. But it is no less true that the era in which Europe and transatlantic relations dominated U.S. foreign policy is over. The answer for Americans is not to browbeat Europeans for this, but to accept it and adjust to it.
所有這些都不能成為要求廢除北約的理由。這個聯(lián)盟中仍有一些成員國在用本國部隊幫助維護歐洲部分地區(qū)的治安，有的成員國可以為中東地區(qū)的穩(wěn)定作出貢獻。不過同樣確定無疑的一點是，歐洲和跨大西洋關系主導美國外交政策的時代已經結束。對于美國人來說， 解決之道不是為此威逼歐洲，而是應該接受現實， 并作出相應的調整。

Richard N. Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations. The director of policy and planning at the State Department from 2001 to 2003, he is the author of “War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars.”
查德.N.哈斯任美國外交學會會長。曾在2001 至2003年擔任美國國務院政策規(guī)劃辦公室主任，著有《必要之戰(zhàn)、選擇之戰(zhàn)：兩場伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭回憶錄》一書。